Auction-based Spectrum Sharing

TitleAuction-based Spectrum Sharing
Publication TypeConference Article
AuthorsHuang, J, Berry, R, Honig, ML
Secondary TitleInternational Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks
Place PublishedUniversity of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
Year of Publication2004
Date PublishedMarch
Publication Languageeng

We study auction-based mechanisms for sharing spectrum among a group of users, sub ject to a constraint on the interference temperature at collocated receivers. The users access the channel using spread spectrum signaling and thus generate interference with each other. Each user receives a utility that is a function of the received signal-to-interference plus noise ratio. We propose two auction mechanisms for allocating the received power. The first is an SINR-based auction, which, when combined with logarithmic utilities, leads to a weighted max-min fair SINR allocation. The second is a power-based auction that maximizes the total utility when the bandwidth is large enough. Both auction mechanisms achieve social optimality in a large system limit where bandwidth, power and the number of users are increased in a fixed proportion. We also give sufficient conditions for global convergence of a distributed updating algorithm and discuss the convergence speed.

Keywordsauction, cognitive radio, game theory, power control, Project:Auction-based Spectrum Sharing, spectrum underlay, wireless communications
Citation Key26
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