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Wireless Network Competitions

Due to the deregulation of telecommunication industry, one can imagine that in the future wireless users will not be contractually tied to a single service provider, but be free to switch in real time to the provider (or providers) offering the best tradeoffs. In this work, we consider a situation where wireless service providers want to earn profit by selling limited amount of wireless resources (e.g., frequency bands, time slots, transmission power) to a group of users. The users are rational economic agents who experience different channel conditions to the base stations of different providers and differ in willingness to pay. We model the interaction of an arbitrary number of providers and users as a two-stage multi-leader-follower game, and prove existence and uniqueness of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a generic channel model and a wide class of users’ utility functions.We show that, interestingly, the competition of resource providers leads to a globally optimal outcome under fairly general technical conditions. Our results show that some users need to purchase their resource from several providers at the equilibrium. While the number of such users is typically small (smaller than the number of providers), our simulations indicate that the percentage of cases where at least one undecided user exists can be significant.
Project Team
NCEL Member: Jianwei Huang 
Collabrator: Vojislav Gajic (EPFL) and Bixio Rimoldi (EPFL)


Gajic, Vojislav, Jianwei Huang, and Bixio Rimoldi Competition of Wireless Providers for Atomic Users: Equilibrium and Social Optimality. Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing. Monticello, IL, USA, 2009. Download: Allerton09.pdf (207.95 KB)
Gajic, Vojislav, Jianwei Huang, and Bixio Rimoldi. "Competition of Wireless Providers for Atomic Users." IEEE Transactions on Networking. 22.2 (2014): 512-525. Download: GajicHuangRimoldi-TON2013.pdf (2.88 MB)



story | by Dr. Radut