Skip to Content

Cooperative Spectrum Sharing

Providing proper economic incentives is essential for the success of dynamic spectrum sharing. Cooperative spectrum sharing is one effective way to achieve this goal. In cooperative spectrum sharing, secondary users (SUs) relay traffics for primary users (PUs), in exchange for dedicated transmission time for the SUs’ own communication needs. The key challenge for the design of cooperative spectrum sharing mechanism is to design to issues: incomplete information of the users (such as channel conditions and energy cost), and dynamic interactions between users over multiple stages of time slots.

In this project, we study the cooperative spectrum sharing under incomplete information, where SUs’ types (capturing their heterogeneity in relay channel gains and evaluations of power consumptions) are private information and not known by PUs. Inspired by the contract theory, we model the network as a labor market. The single PU is the employer who offers a contract to the SUs. The contract consists of a set of contract items representing combinations of spectrum accessing time (i.e., reward) and relaying power (i.e., contribution). The SUs are employees, and each of them selects the best contract item to maximize his payoff. We study the optimal contract design for both weak and strong incomplete information scenarios. First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for feasible contracts in both scenarios. In the weak incomplete information scenario, we further derive the optimal contract that achieves the same maximum PU’s utility as in the complete information benchmark. In the strong incomplete information scenario, we propose a Decompose-and- Compare algorithm that achieves a close-to-optimal contract. We future show that the PU’s average utility loss due to the suboptimal algorithm and the strong incomplete information are both relatively small (less than 2% and 1.3%, respectively, in our numerical results with two SU types).

We then look at the case where a PU and an SU bargain with each other dynamically over multiple stages/time slots with incomplete information. We model the bargaining process as dynamic Bayesian games and characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria under different system model parameters. In particular, we analyze the reputation effect, where an SU may sacrifice immediate payoff in order to create a tough contribution and improve its long-term payoff.



Project Team

NCEL Members: Lingjie Duan, Jianwei Huang, Lin Gao
Collaborators: Jing Wang (Tsinghua University) and Yang Yan (Tsinghua University)

Gao, Lin, Lingjie Duan, and Jianwei Huang. "Two-sided Matching Based Cooperative Spectrum Sharing." IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing. 16.2 (2017): 538-551. Download: 07458177.pdf (1.68 MB)
Zheng, Zijie, et al. Topology-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Cooperative Relay Networks. IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM). San Diego, CA, USA, 2015. Download: 07417716.pdf (334.04 KB)
Duan, Lingjie, Lin Gao, and Jianwei Huang. "Cooperative Spectrum Sharing: A Contract-based Approach." IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing. 13.1 (2014): 174-187. Download: 06342942.pdf (373.36 KB)
Huang, Jianwei. "Market Mechanisms for Cooperative Spectrum Trading with Incomplete Network Information." IEEE Communications Magazine. 51.10 (2013): 201-207. Download: ComMagazine_CameraReady.pdf (2.28 MB)
Yan, Yang, Jianwei Huang, and Jing Wang. "Dynamic Bargaining for Relay-Based Cooperative Spectrum Sharing." IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. 1.8 (2013): 1480-1493. Download: bargainJSAC.pdf (921.13 KB)
Duan, Lingjie, Lin Gao, and Jianwei Huang Contract-based Cooperative Spectrum Sharing. IEEE Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN). Aachen, Germany, 2011. Download: Contract_DySPAN_2011.pdf (393.78 KB)
Yan, Yang, et al. Dynamic Spectrum Negotiation with Asymmetric Information. International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets). Shanghai, China, 2011. Download: BargainGamenets2011.pdf (1 MB)
Yan, Yang, Jianwei Huang, and Jing Wang Dynamic Bayesian Spectrum Bargaining with Non-Myopic Users. International Conference on Wireless Internet (WiCON) (Best Paper Award). Xi'An, China, 2011. Download: WiCON2011.pdf (340.35 KB)
Yan, Yang, et al. Sequential Bargaining in Cooperative Spectrum Sharing: Incomplete Information with Reputation Effect. IEEE Global Communications Conference. Houston, TX, USA, 2011. Download: GC11Bargain.pdf (225.06 KB)






story | by Dr. Radut